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Abstract 
Australia has had a variable and mostly arid climate as long as humans have been on the continent. 
Historically observed trends toward increased warming, with rainfall increases in many tropical areas and 
rainfall decreases in many temperate areas, are projected to continue. Impacts will be geographically 
variable but mostly negative for biodiversity, agriculture, and infrastructure. Extreme events such as 
bushfires and floods will increase in frequency and intensity, concentrated in summer. With an economy 
heavily dependent on coal for domestic electricity generation and as an export commodity, Australians 
are high per capita contributors to anthropogenic climate change. A quarter-century of steps to mitigation 
led in 2012 to a carbon price that has the long-term potential to shift the economy toward more 
renewable energy sources. However as in other parts of the world this change has come too late, and is 
proceeding too slowly, to avoid significant climate change. A heritage of indigenous adaptation, strong 
volunteer cultures, and contemporary cultural diversity provide Australia with considerable adaptive 
capacity for gradual changes, but the nation is underprepared for sudden or step changes. We identify 
four pressing research and policy needs focused on such changes: (1) systematic attention to processes 
and impacts of negative transformative change, or worst-case scenarios, (2) improve forecasts of year-to-
year rainfall and climate variability, focusing on processes and climate drivers that may change in 
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resources, and (4) articulation of alternative governance mechanisms that can interact dynamically with 
strong government. 
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Climate change and Australia
Lesley Head,1∗ Michael Adams,1 Helen V. McGregor2
and Stephanie Toole1
Australia has had a variable and mostly arid climate as long as humans have been on
the continent. Historically observed trends toward increased warming, with rainfall
increases in many tropical areas and rainfall decreases in many temperate areas, are
projected to continue. Impacts will be geographically variable but mostly negative
for biodiversity, agriculture, and infrastructure. Extreme events such as bushfires
and floods will increase in frequency and intensity, concentrated in summer.
With an economy heavily dependent on coal for domestic electricity generation
and as an export commodity, Australians are high per capita contributors to
anthropogenic climate change. A quarter-century of steps to mitigation led in 2012
to a carbon price that has the long-term potential to shift the economy toward more
renewable energy sources. However as in other parts of the world this change has
come too late, and is proceeding too slowly, to avoid significant climate change.
A heritage of indigenous adaptation, strong volunteer cultures, and contemporary
cultural diversity provide Australia with considerable adaptive capacity for gradual
changes, but the nation is underprepared for sudden or step changes. We identify
four pressing research and policy needs focused on such changes: (1) systematic
attention to processes and impacts of negative transformative change, or worst-
case scenarios, (2) improve forecasts of year-to-year rainfall and climate variability,
focusing on processes and climate drivers that may change in response to higher
greenhouse gases, (3) identification and engagement of diverse cross-cultural
resources, and (4) articulation of alternative governance mechanisms that can
interact dynamically with strong government. © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
How to cite this article:
WIREs Clim Change 2014, 5:175–197. doi: 10.1002/wcc.255
INTRODUCTION
The Australian continent encompasses tropical,temperate, arid, and alpine habitats and climate
regimes, all with high variability. The Australian
nation faces climate change with high levels of
affluence, consumption levels, and emissions growth.1
Much of the continent is arid and fire-prone, with
low soil fertility and low relief. Agriculture occurs
in the more fertile and well-watered areas, with
rangeland grazing spread across much of central
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and northern Australia. Both these land uses were
introduced with European settlement in 1788, and
both have contributed significantly to underlying
environmental problems with which climate change is
interacting—biodiversity decline, over-allocation and
reduced quality of freshwater, localized salination.2,3
With a long coastline and extensive maritime zones,
the nation must also deal with the coastal and marine
dimensions of climate change. Over 80% of people
live within 50 km of the coast,4 and all the major cities
are coastal. Populations in rural and remote Australia
bear disproportionate stewardship responsibilities for
landscapes fundamental to food production and to
the protection of plants, animals, soil, and water. For
example, indigenous groups now own or control 23%
of the land area of the continent.5
These factors combine to make the expres-
sion and impact of climate change in Australia
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geographically and socioeconomically variable. Cli-
mate processes interact in complex ways with other
biophysical phenomena and social processes at varied
temporal and spatial scales. In this paper we provide
an overview of climate change trends, and set them in
their political, economic, and sociocultural contexts.
We outline steps taken in mitigation and adaptation,
provide an overview of projected impacts, and identify
contributions and gaps in research.
CLIMATIC BACKGROUND
At a geological scale, the aridity of the continent can
be seen as a long-term consequence of its northward
movement over the last 30 million years as part of
the breakup of Gondwana. The final separation from
Antarctica about 34 million years ago allowed the
development of the circumpolar current, cutting off
heat transfer from the equator6 and leading to the
development of the atmospheric circulation known as
the Hadley cell. The interior of the continent is now
arid to semiarid because it sits below the descending
(drying) arm of this subtropical ridge. Periodically
over the last 2 million years, the fluctuating ‘glacial’
climates of the Pleistocene took expression in these
desert regions not so much in ice ages (as they did
in the Australian alps) but as cold dry ages; the last
glacial maximum was intensely arid as well as cold.7
The north of the continent is now dominated by
tropical climate systems; monsoonal rains during the
summer wet season (November–April), with a dry
season for the remainder of the year. Further south
the climate is characterized by winter storm activity
originating in the Southern Ocean, and summer high
pressure systems pushed southward by the monsoon.
Superimposed on this general structure is high
year-to-year rainfall variability. Overall Australian
rainfall patterns are heterogeneous regionally and
seasonally. Rainfall from tropical cyclones can
penetrate well into the continental interior causing
intermittent widespread inundation. The El Niño-
Southern Oscillation (ENSO), a tropical Pacific Ocean
change in ocean heat content and atmospheric
circulation, occurs intermittently every 2–7 years and
significantly affects interannual rainfall patterns in
eastern and southern regions. El Niño events are
associated with increased likelihood of drought,
and La Niña events with above average rainfall.
Sea surface temperatures across the Indian Ocean
(the Indian Ocean Dipole) and the position of
the Southern Hemisphere westerlies (the Southern
Annular Mode) also play a role in rainfall variability,
particularly in the south of the continent. These
climatic processes, that operate from geological to
decadal and shorter timescales, severely constrain
water availability and have had major impacts on
past and present populations.
HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF A FOSSIL
FUEL ECONOMY
The first people arrived in Australia about
50,000 years ago, when the interior was cooler
and wetter than today. There have been arguments
that subsequent Aboriginal burning practices helped
contribute to a drying climate,8 nevertheless Abo-
riginal groups are widely seen as having adapted
successfully to fluctuating Pleistocene conditions,
including the much harsher climates of the last glacial
maximum, and also to the warmer, wetter, and
more diverse environments of the Holocene (the last
10,000 years).7,9 With colonization by the British
at the end of the 18th century, an economy in the
throes of the industrial revolution—with concomitant
demands for resources—was brutally superimposed
on a hunter-gatherer landscape. Australia’s contem-
porary economy was built on this history of exporting
primary products and raw materials. Key 19th century
exports, gold and wool, have now been overtaken by
coal and iron ore, but the legacy of the quarry and
the farm continues to shape emissions patterns.
In 2005, Australia ranked 15th in the world as
a producer of greenhouse gas emissions, contributing
560.0 million metric tonnes of CO2 equivalent (1.48%
of total).10 Australia’s per capita emissions (28.1
tonnes of CO2 equivalent, 2006 data) are the highest
of any OECD country, nearly twice the OECD average
and more than four times the world average.11
Australia’s per capita emissions are high because
electricity production (35.8% of national emissions,
2010–2011 data) is dominated by the burning of
coal.12 Transport (16.1%) and agriculture (14.5%)
are also significant contributors (Table 1). Black and
brown coal account for the greatest share of the
energy mix (37%), followed by petroleum products
(35%) and gas (23%) (Figure 1). Renewable energy
has remained largely constant at around 5% of the
energy mix over the last decade. Of this, around 67%
is sourced from biomass (wood and bagasse), 16%
from hydro-power, and 17% from biofuels, wind,
and solar energy.13 Nuclear energy is not used, and
there is considerable potential for geothermal energy.6
Australia also contributes to global emissions
via the fossil fuels it exports. In 2007–2008 Australia
exported (as coal, uranium, and gas) more than
two thirds of the geologically stored energy that it
extracted.14 The country is the world’s largest coal
exporter.15
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TABLE 1 Australian Greenhouse Gas Emissions by Sector,
2010–2011.12
Sector
Emissions
(Mt)
Per
cent
Electricity 193.0 35.75
Stationary energy (excluding electricity) 97.3 18.03
Transport 86.8 16.08
Fugitive emissions 37.5 6.95
Industrial processes 32.9 6.09
Agriculture 78.2 14.49
Waste 14.2 2.63
Total 539.8 100.00
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FIGURE 1 | Australia’s total primary energy supply, by energy type,
1973–2010.13
TABLE 2 Australian Energy Consumption by Sector and Industry,
2009–2010.
Sector
Consumption
(PJ)
Per
cent
Manufacturing 1034 26.08
Households 1015 25.61
Transport, postal, and warehousing 544 13.72
Mining 543 13.70
Other services 429 10.82
Electricity, gas, water, and waste services 146 3.68
Construction 144 3.63
Agriculture, forestry, and fishing 109 2.75
Total 3964 100.00
Source: Ref.16
Energy consumption is dominated by the
electricity generation, transport, and manufacturing
sectors. In 2009–2010 industry accounted for
approximately three-quarters of the energy used, with
households accounting for the other quarter.16 Of all
sectors, the manufacturing industry was the largest
end user of energy by industry (Table 2).
CLIMATE CHANGE—OVERVIEW
OF TRENDS
This fossil fuel-based economy, repeated in different
forms in many parts of the world over the 20th cen-
tury, and particularly since 195017, has contributed
to the climate changes already being experienced in
Australia and around the world.18 In this section we
outline historical and projected trends in Australia.
Temperature Trends
From 1910 to 2011 the Australian continent has
warmed 0.9◦C,19 more than the global average of
0.7◦C for the same interval.20 Furthermore, the
majority of this warming has occurred since 1950,
with every decade after 1950 being warmer on average
than that preceding.18 At the regional scale there
are significant heterogeneities, with the east recording
up to 2◦C increase since 1960 and the northwest
recording a slight cooling (−0.4◦C). Climate model
simulations reproduce Australia’s temperature trends
when the simulations include greenhouse gas forcing,
in addition to natural climate forcing factors (e.g.,
solar and volcanic).21,22
The continent-scale trends observed recently are
projected to continue into the future as atmospheric
greenhouse gas concentrations increase, though the
trend is likely to be amplified as land areas warm faster
than oceans.23 Although it is important to identify the
long-term trends, on a shorter timescale there is also
evidence that anthropogenic warming has occurred in
discrete steps rather than gradually,24 with significant
implications for adaptation.
Rainfall Trends
As the driest inhabited continent on Earth, Australia
is particularly vulnerable to relatively small changes
in rainfall. Four regions have experienced significant
changes in rainfall since 1900 and particularly since
195025: northwest Australia, southwest Western Aus-
tralia, southeast Australia, and northeast Australia
(Figure 2).
The northwest is the only region to have
experienced a long-term increase in annual rainfall,
predominantly in the summer months.20,26 This
change is attributed to higher atmospheric levels of
aerosols, particularly from Asia, enhancing cloud
formation and rainfall,27,28 and to changes in the
monsoon trough leading to more intense atmospheric
convection.26
Southwest Western Australia has recorded a
steady decline in rainfall over the past 30 years,
with a 15% decrease in winter rainfall since the
Volume 5, March/Apr i l 2014 © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 177
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FIGURE 2 | Trend in rainfall based on 1950–2007 period (mm year−1).23
mid-1970s.20 The decline is associated with a
southward displacement of storm tracks,29 changes
in greenhouse gases and ozone,30 and/or landuse
changes.31 The rainfall decline in southwest Western
Australia has resulted in a 60% reduction in stream
flows, with implications for water storage for Perth,
the West Australian state capital.20,23
The southeast and east of Australia have
experienced drying since the mid-1990s (see Box 1),
including a 61% decrease in March–May rainfall.32
There are likely multiple causes for the decline.
Rainfall variability in eastern Australia is closely
associated with the ENSO, in combination with other
factors.23 However, the frequency and intensity of El
Niño events have increased since the 1970s; ENSO
displays large year-to-year variability and so far it has
not been possible to characterize the true nature of
this variability and any links to global warming.33
Rainfall and Temperature Extremes
Changes in Australian rainfall trends are dominated
by changes in very heavy rainfall events, that is,
there has been a decrease in very heavy rainfall
events in eastern Australia and an increase in western
Australia.26 Trends in extreme rainfall are not only
strongly correlated with average rainfall trends but
also positively associated with average temperature
and extreme temperature trends.40 In terms of extreme
temperatures, the number of record-breaking hot
days per decade has increased every decade since
the 1950s,20,41 pointing to an increased frequency of
warmer weather (Figure 3).40 Combining temperature
and precipitation extremes into a single index shows
that from 1911 to 2008 hot/wet extremes have
increased in all seasons at an average rate of 1–2%
per decade.18 Australia is likely to experience warmer
temperature extremes with increased warm nights and
heatwaves, and longer dry spells with intermittent
extreme precipitation.42
Extreme Events
Although no single event can be attributed
directly to anthropogenic climate change, extreme
events are projected to occur more frequently as
warming continues. Further, long-term and regular
processes such as droughts are displaying different
characteristics. The ‘Big Dry’ of 1995–2009 (also
referred to as the Millennium Drought) (see Box 1)
is one such example, displaying meteorological
characteristics43 that are different from earlier
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BOX 1
THE ‘BIG DRY’—SEVERE DROUGHT
1995–2009
The period from 1995 to 2009 is referred
to as the ‘Big Dry’34 or Millennium Drought,
during which the southeast of Australia (east
of 135◦E and south of 33◦S) experienced the
most severe drought of the past 120 years
of instrumental records.35 On the basis of
palaeoclimatic reconstructions it is likely that the
decade 1998–2008 was the driest since European
settlement.36 The Big Dry was characterized
by a decline in autumn and winter rainfall,
and an absence of very wet years, and this
autumn/winter rainfall deficit continues despite
the exceptional wet years of 2011–2012. The
Big Dry, along with the Federation Drought
(1895–1902) and the World War II drought
(1937–1945) are attributed to cooler conditions
over the Indian Ocean that change wind
fields such that moisture flux anomalies are
directed away from Australia toward east
Africa,37 although changes in other synoptic
rainfall patterns may also play a role.32,38 The
unprecedented severity of the Big Dry, however,
was exacerbated by recent temperatures 0.3-
0.6◦C above the long-term average.39 This period
faced a number of tragic bushfire events,
including the Canberra fires of January 2003 and
the Victorian ‘Black Saturday’ fires of 2009.
droughts; these appear to be related to global
warming.44 Austral summer (December-January-
February) is the season when extreme events will
likely be experienced most often because both tropical
(cyclones, floods, coastal storms) and temperate
(prolonged heatwaves, heat stress, fires) extremes
occur at this time. This will create seasonal pressures
on emergency services, an issue we discuss further
below. The period 2009–2013 includes a number
of extreme weather events, where their severity and
impacts may be partial analogs for future extremes:
Heatwaves, Heat Deaths, and Bushfire Weather
Two of the most severe bushfires in recent times, the
‘Black Saturday’ (February 7, 2009) and the severe
January 2013 bushfires across southeast Australia,
occurred during record-breaking heatwaves.25,45,46
The Black Saturday bushfires in the greater Melbourne
metropolitan area occurred during the second of two
exceptionally warm episodes during the prevailing
heatwave: 6–8 February, when Melbourne recorded
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FIGURE 3 | Trends in Indices of extreme temperature for Australia,
1910–2012. (a) Annual count of hot days and nights. Hot days have
maximum temperatures >35◦C and hot nights have minimum
temperatures >20◦C. (b) Annual count of cold days and nights. Cold
days have maximum temperatures <15◦C and cold nights have
minimum temperatures <5◦C. (Data source: Bureau of Meteorology).
its highest ever maximum temperature (46.4◦C on
February 7, the day of the bushfires46). The ‘Black
Saturday’ fires killed 173 people in the Melbourne
metropolitan area.25 The first week of the heatwave
(January 26 to February 1) included the exceptionally
warm 28–31 January interval, and Melbourne’s
highest average daily temperature was recorded
(35.4◦C on January 30). Worryingly, during this phase
of the heatwave there were an additional 374 deaths in
greater Melbourne compared to the long-term average
for comparable periods in the past.47
The January 2013 bushfires in Tasmania,
Victoria, and New South Wales also occurred during
an interval when most of Australia experienced near
record-breaking heat. The so-called ‘Angry Summer’48
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occurred following warmer than average temperatures
for austral spring and early summer 2012.45 During
the prolonged and extensive heatwave, from late
December 2012 through to mid-January 2013, most
of Australia experienced extreme heat at some point,
and as a result January 2013 is now Australia’s hottest
month on record.45
Bushfire risk depends on the dryness and amount
of fuel, prevailing weather, and likelihood of ignition.
Of 38 sites where fire weather trends from 1973
to 2010 were analyzed, 16 have experienced a
significant increase in fire risk and none showed a
significant decrease.49 Climate forecasts suggest that
heatwaves and bushfire weather are likely to occur
more frequently in the future.
The Wettest 2-Year Period on
Record—2010–2011 and the Floods of January
2013
The ‘Big Dry’ in southeast Australia ended in 2010,
with heavy rain events heralding Australia’s wettest
2-year period on record.50 The heavy rainfall led
to major river flooding in Queensland and New
South Wales, including in the Queensland capital
Brisbane. Most of the continent received rainfall
very much above average, the exception being the
southwest corner, which in 2010 had its driest year
on record. The exceptional rainfall was strongly
associated with back-to-back La Niña events and
with the highest sea surface temperatures in the region
since 1900.25 The La Niña of 2010–2011 was one
of the strongest ever recorded and, although the
La Niña event of 2011–2012 was weaker, it also
coincided with warm ocean temperatures. While much
of Australia experienced extreme heat in early to mid-
January 2013, from 22 to 29 January heavy rainfall
triggered severe flooding along coastal Queensland
and northern New South Wales, comparable in
magnitude to the flooding in 2011.51 The relationship
between heavy rainfall and warmer ocean and
atmospheric temperatures is well established, and
precipitation extremes are likely to occur more often
in the future.52
Ocean Temperature and Sea Level Rise
Much of Australia’s population reside along the
coastal fringe and the effects of rising greenhouse
gas concentrations are already being felt in marine
environments. Ocean surface temperatures around
Australia have increased by 0.9◦C since 1900,20
higher than the global average of 0.7◦C, and the
rate of warming has accelerated in recent decades.53
Warming is greatest in the southeast and southwest of
the continent.20 The increased warmth has shifted
coastal climate zones for 10.5–29.5◦S south by
>200 km along the east coast and 100 km along the
west coast.54 Significant coral bleaching has occurred
on the Great Barrier Reef between 1998 and 2002.20
Systematic monitoring of sea levels around
the Australian coastline began in the early 1990s.
Although trends are difficult to confirm over such a
short record, sea levels have risen around Australia,
consistent with global trends.55,56 Rates of sea level
rise have been greatest on the western and northern
coasts, and are linked to interannual climate variations
(e.g., ENSO), changes in the strength of the East
Australia current, and atmospheric circulation. Sea
level rise has exacerbated the impact of storm surge
events, which coincide with strong onshore winds and
high tides, resulting in coastal flooding and erosion.57
Sea levels are projected to continue to rise to 20–60 cm
above 1990 levels, although this could be higher since
considerable uncertainty surrounds the degree of ice
sheet melting in response to global warming.3
From the above examples it can be seen that
Australia is already experiencing the effects of climate
change. This has taken place so far mostly via
weather patterns, particularly extreme events, that
are historically recognizable but will likely occur with
greater frequency and/or intensity.
POLITICAL MOVES TOWARDS
CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION
Within this context of changing climates, a carbon
pricing scheme, or ‘Carbon Tax’, was brought into
effect on July 1, 2012. This is no mean feat for the
world’s largest coal exporter, but it was a ‘long and
bruising’58 political road. More than two decades
of initiatives and several changes of government led
up to this legislation (Table 3), eventually passed by
a minority Labor government with the support of
the Greens party and independents, and vociferously
opposed by powerful mining and energy interests.62
As Table 3 shows, there was more history of
bipartisanship toward the end of the previous Howard
government. By 2008 there was majority support
(58%) for an Emissions Trading Scheme, with a
significant minority (22%) opposing.63 Opposition
could include Greens supporters who thought the
proposed Scheme to be ineffectual, as well as climate
change sceptics or others who thought the scheme too
strong. This bipartisanship disappeared completely
once Malcolm Turnbull lost the Opposition leadership
to Tony Abbott in 2009.64
The long period of political preparation meant
that there was also a long period of bureaucratic
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TABLE 3 Australia’s Labor Party is left-leaning and the Liberal Party is right-leaning.59–61 (Federal Elections in 2010, 2007, 2004, 2001, 1998,
1996, 1993)
Date Action
1987–1988 CSIRO and Commission for the Future convene major conferences and publish outcomes.
1989 State governments of NSW, Victoria, and WA adopt Toronto target (20% reduction in 1988 greenhouse gas levels by
2005) as interim objective.
Hawke (Labor) signs Declaration of The Hague, which recognized the global significance of climate change
Hawke Government does not sign up to Toronto target but establishes National Climate Change Program to assess
achievable targets.
1990 Hawke Government adopts an interim planning target of stabilizing emissions at 1988 levels by 2000 and reducing by
20% by 2005. Caveat includes that ‘the Government will not proceed with measures which have net adverse
economic impacts nationally or on Australia’s trade competitiveness in the absence of similar action by major
greenhouse gas producing countries’.59
1992 Federal-State Council of Australian Governments endorses National Greenhouse Response Strategy.
Keating (Labor) signs the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).
1995 Keating Government introduces Greenhouse 21C program and Greenhouse Challenge Program involving voluntary
agreements with major industrial emitters.
NSW Carr Labor Government implements Green Power Schemes and establishes Sustainable Energy Development
Authority.
1997 Howard (Liberal) Government establishes Australian Greenhouse Office and announces Renewable Energy Policy (which
originally required the electricity sector to source an additional 2% of electricity from new renewable sources).
1998 Australian Greenhouse Office releases the National Greenhouse Strategy, which acknowledges climate change and
Australia’s international obligation.
2000 Howard Government establishes the Photovoltaic Rebate Program (PVRP) which offered rebates to households and
community groups to install PV power systems.
2006 Howard Government establishes the Prime Ministerial Task Group on Emissions Trading to advise on implementation of
an emissions trading scheme (ETS).
2007 Howard Government commits to introducing an ETS.
Rudd (Labor) Government ratifies Kyoto Protocol following November Federal election.
Department of Climate Change established.
Photovoltaic Rebate Program rebranded to Solar Homes and Communities Program (SHCP).
2008 White Paper released on Rudd Government’s Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme (CPRS).
National Solar Schools Program in operation, offering schools competitive grants to install solar and renewable power
systems, rainwater tanks and energy efficiency measures.
2009 CPRS legislation introduced into Parliament, voted down in the Senate twice.
Solar Homes and Communities phased out and replaced by Solar Credits Program.
Rudd Government introduces Home Insulation Program and the Solar Hot Water Rebate Program (replaced by
Renewable Energy Bonus Scheme in 2010).
2010 Gillard (Labor) Government establishes the Multi-Party Climate Change Committee (MPCCC).
2011 MPCCC recommends a fixed carbon price be implemented 1 July 2012, transitioning to a flexible-price cap-and-trade
ETS on 1 July 2015.
Clean Energy Bill is introduced and passed by Parliament.
2012 Carbon price brought into effect on 1 July 2012.
preparation. Government-funded institutions such as
the Bureau of Meteorology and the Commonwealth
Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation
(CSIRO) have played an important role in building
long-term data sets, modeling future changes,
emissions scenarios, and energy alternatives, and
communicating with the public. The recent politics
of climate change have been particularly fraught,
reflecting the dependence of the nation on fossil fuels
and the difficulty of the task. There have been splits
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between political parties, between environmental and
energy ministers (and their departments) and within
the Australian population (see following section).
Climate change indirectly contributed to two recent
opposition leaders (Nelson and Turnbull), three prime
ministers (Howard, Rudd, and Gillard), and a number
of senior ministers losing their jobs.
The carbon price, one part of a broader energy
reform package called the Clean Energy Plan, aims
to reduce greenhouse gas emissions in Australia by
5% below 2000 levels by 2020, and 80% below
2000 levels by 2050. Government will be advised
on annual caps and future emissions targets by
an independent, expertise-based body, the Climate
Change Authority.65 The scheme currently requires
liable entities, characterized as ‘Australia’s largest
polluters’ (numbering about 323 as at January 2013),
to buy permits for each tonne of CO2 emitted.
A fixed price was to apply for the first 3 years,
after which the price would be set by the market
(the government has recently brought forward the
date of the change by 1 year).66 Major industries
affected by the carbon price include electricity
and energy generators, mining, business transport,
and waste and industrial processors. Incorporated
into the scheme are financial assistance and energy
efficiency measures for households and businesses.
In the first 3 months of operation of the carbon
price, hydro electricity generation increased and coal-
fired generation decreased,67 and this pattern had
continued after 1 year.68 The government figures
indicate that renewables increased their proportion
of electricity generation by 28.5% and coal decreased
its by 17.5% over the first 12 months of operation.
Since its inception the carbon price has received
mixed reviews from both the media and the public,
often centring around the fact that Prime Minister
Gillard had to break a promise to implement it. As
the nation approaches an election in late 2013, the
future of the carbon price is not clear at the time
of writing. The Rudd Labor government has signaled
an intention to move 1 year earlier than planned to
an emissions trading scheme, with the price set by
the market, and the Abbott Liberal opposition has
promised to abandon the scheme entirely. As Jotzo
argues, ‘Australia’s carbon pricing mechanism might
enter history as one of the best-designed yet shortest-
lived policies for climate change mitigation’.58
The task of shifting an economy away from
its historical dependence on fossil fuels—not only
for domestic consumption, but also as an important
part of export industry—has a high degree of
difficulty. Because of the scale required, and for
consistency across the economy, only a strong national
government can accomplish this task, albeit with
cooperation and coordination between state and local
governments. Even then any government will likely
face mixed responses from the population, who may
have to make some sacrifices.
CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES
ON CLIMATE CHANGE
What Australians believe about climate change helps
in understanding the political arguments.69 Most
Australians accept that climate change is happening
(about 75%, depending on the wording of the
question), but only about 50% think human activity
is the main driver. However, about 90% agree
that climate change is ‘partially’ human-induced.
Consistent with trends in other Western countries,
a decline in climate change belief since 2008 is evident
(8–10% decline, depending on the poll). Suggested
factors are the global financial crisis, the failure of
Copenhagen and ‘climategate’ in December 2009,70
but none of these have been systematically tested.
Also consistent with the United States and Western
European countries, higher levels of belief in human-
induced climate change are found among women
and people with left-wing political beliefs (including
politicians themselves).64,69,71 Reasons for these
gender differences have not been fully researched,
but are consistent with the ‘white male’ effect72
in accepting higher levels of risk (e.g., in bushfire
preparedness73). A less powerful predictor of belief in
climate change is the rural/urban divide, with slightly
but statistically significant lower levels in rural areas,
and marked differences between city dwellers (58%)
and primary producers (27%) in believing that human
activity is the primary cause of climate change.69
Although it is widely recognized that resilience and
adaptive capacity are culturally variable, research
is just beginning to pay attention to the role of
ethnicity.74,75
Climate change denialism is strong in Australia,
although there is a limited amount of academic
research into its sources and expression. As in the
United States, denialism is closely associated with
conservative think tanks.76 In one detailed study, five
different sceptical discourses were identified among
residents of the Australian Capital Territory.77 These
were ‘closely intertwined with other beliefs such as
mistrust of institutions and protectiveness toward
Australia’s national interests’ (p. 408). In a rare
anthropological analysis78 in the Hunter Valley region
of NSW (an important coal mining area), Connor
argues that climate change has set in train a cultural
crisis. She argues that discourses of fear, scepticism,
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denial, and apathy gain traction because ‘in Australia
today, the dominant symbolic systems, religious or
secular, do not contest the life-affirming messages of
fossil-fuel fired consumer culture’.78
Opinions vary in Australia over how much
power denialist arguments actually wield with both
politicians and the broader public. While there are
some deeply entrenched cultural factors that are
important to understand, it would be a mistake
for researchers to focus only on denialism. Even
those who accept the science on climate change
have trouble imagining the scale of mooted and/or
necessary socioeconomic transformations, whether
chosen or forced. One role for researchers is to
help imagine how different scenarios may play out in
practice. Further, while public education programs are
important,79 cultural perspectives on climate change
are much broader than just questions of attitude and
belief. Among farmers, for example, adaptive capacity
does not map neatly onto climate change belief, but
relates to a combination of social and economic factors
influencing resilience.80 Beliefs interact with everyday
practice and socioeconomic structures in complex
ways that we consider below.
IMPACTS AND MOVES TOWARDS
ADAPTATION
Projected climate changes are likely to have significant
impacts on Australia’s infrastructure, agriculture,
fisheries, and unique flora and fauna (Table 4).
There are likely to be positive feedbacks between
different influences, e.g., increased bushfire risk and
frequency81 will influence biodiversity outcomes.
There has been increasing recognition that ‘already
Australia faces a stark fact—the opportunity to avoid
climate change altogether has passed’.82 A growing
body of research now focuses on how to adapt83 to
extreme events and bushfires,84–86 drier conditions,87
rising sea levels,88,89 and heat-related effects including
reduced life expectancy.90
The Federal Government funded a National
Climate Change Adaptation Research Facility
(NCCARF) 2008–2013 to coordinate blueprints for
research across a 5–7 year time horizon. Nine themes
were selected: Terrestrial Biodiversity, Marine Biodi-
versity and Resources, Human Health, Freshwater
Biodiversity, Settlements and Infrastructure, Emer-
gency Management, Primary Industries, Indigenous
Communities, and Social, Economic, and Institutional
Dimensions. Adaptation Research Plans were pro-
duced under each theme, and a program of grants
funded initial research (see www.nccarf.edu.au for
full list of plans, publications, and policy guidance
briefs).
Among the last publications produced by
NCCARF before funding ceased on June 30, 2013
were synthesis reports for each state. To take the New
South Wales synthesis report as an example,91 there is
a combination of quite specific recommendations with
much more general ones. Specific recommendations
include the need for a heatwave policy in aged-
care facilities, while more general ones include
that agricultural adaptation will be primarily driven
in the private sector, with government playing a
supporting role. A further issue is that while the
key recommendations for state government decision
makers in the same report are very general, some
would be extremely radical if implemented properly;
for example, the need to ‘ensure structures and
institutions are flexible and can react to emerging
issues and unforeseen events’.91
The evidence indicates that Australia is still
in the early stages of considering climate change
adaptation and its relationship to other aspects
of public policy. A survey of government and
business organizations in late 200892 found that:
‘only 59% of surveyed organizations have conducted
a formal vulnerability assessment, and less than
40% have implemented any specific planning or
other changes aimed at adapting to future climate
change impacts’. Adaptation activity was found to be
linked to knowledge and beliefs about climate change
issues, and is stronger in organizations with longer
planning horizons. Adaptation actions that can be
implemented by Australian governments are linked
to their functions, including—for local government
as an example—infrastructure and property services,
planning and development regulation, provision of
health, water and sewage services, and natural
resource management.93,94 However, as a survey of
coastal councils in five states shows95 (Figure 4),
most are still in a state of risk analysis and strategy
preparation.
It is of course difficult to separate adaptation to
climate change from adaptation to other drivers of
change and uncertainty that might apply, whether in
business, agriculture or natural resource management.
And this need not be a problem. As Dovers argued,96
incremental climate change can be well adapted to
using existing social and economic systems that may
well already be effective even if they have nothing to
do with climate change. With strong civic institutions
and a robust volunteer culture (more than one
third of the adult population did voluntary work
in 201097), Australia has a long heritage of coping
stoically with the management of emergencies such
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TABLE 4 Differences between Probable Unmitigated and Mitigated Futures at 2100—Median of Probability Distributions
Mitigation
Sector No mitigation 550 ppm CO2-e 450 ppm CO2-e
Irrigated agriculture
in the
Murray-Darling
Basin
Ninety-two percent decline in
irrigated agricultural production
in the Basin, affecting dairy,
fruit, vegetables and grains.
Twenty percent decline in irrigated
agricultural production in the
Basin.
Six percent decline in irrigated
agricultural production in the
Basin.
Natural
resource-based
tourism (Great
Barrier Reef and
Alpine areas)
Catastrophic destruction of the
Great Barrier Reef. Reef no
longer dominated by corals.
Disappearance of reef as we know
it, with high impact to
reef-based tourism.
Three-dimensional structure of
the corals largely gone and
system dominated by fleshy
seaweed and soft corals.
Mass bleaching of the coral reef
twice as common as today.
Snow-based tourism in Australia is
likely to have disappeared.
Alpine flora and fauna highly
vulnerable because of retreat of
snowline.
Moderate increase in artificial snowmaking.
Water supply
infrastructure
Up to 34% increase in the cost of
supplying urban water, due
largely to extensive
supplementation of urban water
systems with alternative water
sources.
Up to 5% increase in the cost of
supplying urban water.
Low-level supplementation with
alternative water sources.
Up to 4% increase in the cost of
supplying urban water.
Low-level supplementation with
alternative water sources.
Buildings in coastal
settlements
Significant risk to coastal buildings
from storm events and sea-level
rise, leading to localized coastal
and flash flooding and extreme
wind damage.
Significantly less storm energy in
the climate system and in turn
reduced risk to coastal buildings
from storm damage.
Substantially less storm energy in
the climate system and in turn
greatly reduced risk to coastal
buildings from storm damage.
Temperature-related
death
Over 4000 additional heat-related
deaths in Queensland each year.
A ‘bad-end story’ (10% chance)
would lead to more than 9500
additional heat-related deaths
in Queensland each year.
Fewer than 80 additional
heat-related deaths in
Queensland each year.
Fewer deaths in Queensland than
at present because of slight
warming leading to decline in
cold-related deaths.
Geopolitical stability
in the Asia-Pacific
region
Sea-level rise beginning to cause
major dislocation in coastal
megacities of south Asia,
south-east Asia, and China, and
displacement of people in
islands adjacent to Australia.
Substantially lower sea-level rise anticipated and in turn
greatly reduced risk to low-lying populations.
Displacement of people in small island countries of
South Pacific.
The assessment of impacts in this table does not build in centrally coordinated adaption. The median of the probability distribution is used for the scenarios
considered.11
as fires, cyclones, and floods. However increases in
the frequency and intensity of such hazards will
create new pressures and vulnerabilities. For example,
following repeated Queensland floods, some insurance
companies have increased premiums and become
less willing to insure houses on floodplains.98 A
recent report on preparedness for extreme events
concluded that there is considerable variability
in preparedness across organizations and different
sectors of society.99 Developing effective coordination
between different levels of government, including
the need for interoperability of emergency service
organizations and their key personnel, were identified
as important issues.
There are also major questions over whether a
gradualist conceptualization of climate change leads
to only incremental adaptive responses, leaving the
community poorly equipped for unanticipated rapid
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FIGURE 4 | Initiatives undertaken or planned by coastal councils.
N = 34.95
or severe change.24,100 For example, an NCCARF
overview argues that ‘whilst there is a large body of
research to assist the emergency management sector to
adapt to the current climate, research that considers
future conditions is not as well developed’.101
Biodiversity
Climate change clearly alters biodiversity and interacts
with the processes (such as land use change) that have
caused many extinctions over the last 200 years.102
Both native and exotic ‘ecologically generalist’ species
are likely to expand their range at the expense of
native specialists, and extinction rates of narrow-
ranged endemics, especially in montane and coastal
habitats, will increase.102 For example, of 100 Banksia
species in the global biodiversity hotspot of southwest
Western Australia, two thirds are projected to decline
in range and only 6% to expand or remain stable.
Between 5 and 25% would suffer range losses of
100% by 2080, primarily because of precipitation
decline.103 As we move into what are referred to as
no-analog conditions, species will combine in new and
unpredictable ways, known as novel ecosystems.104
Coral-based ecosystems, including the World
Heritage Great Barrier Reef, are among the most
vulnerable. Between 1998 and 2003 coral bleaching
occurred on 50% of reefs within the GBR Marine
Park, the most severe since first records of this
process in 1979.105,106 Bleaching occurs when ocean
temperatures rise to 1–2◦C above the long-term
summer maximum and are sustained for several
weeks. If global temperatures rise by 2◦C by 2100,
bleaching is forecast to occur annually and would
likely result in a shift to macro-algae dominated
communities by 2050. Other impacts on coral reefs
include ocean acidification, increased susceptibility
to disease, damage from tropical cyclones and storm
surges, changes in community structure due to sea level
rise, and the growth of reefs at higher latitudes.3,107
Additional likely marine impacts include
expansion of mangroves as coastal lands flood,
damage to sea grass meadows due to the increased
storm frequency, and changes due to ocean
acidification.4 Heatwaves occur in oceans as well as
on land. In the summer of 2010–2011 a warming
anomaly 2–4◦C persisted for more than 10 weeks in
the Indian Ocean along the coast of southwestern
Australia, where the tropical/temperate transition
zone is a hotspot of marine biodiversity. The event
led to a significant shift in the community structure,
suggesting that it is these extreme events that dominate
marine ecosystem structural change.108,109
The combination of climate and biodiversity
changes will challenge the national reserve system
in several ways. Reserve systems based on static
distributions, or framings of restoration as a return
to historical baselines, will be inadequate for the
changes already in train. Enhanced connectivity
between separate reserves, and increased integration
with off-reserve lands, will be needed to allow species
to move, where possible.110 The recently announced
National Wildlife Corridors Plan attempts to address
these issues by promoting a ‘whole-of-landscape’
approach integrating multiple land uses including
biodiversity conservation. It is too early to assess
the effectiveness of this plan, and some farmers’
organizations have raised equity questions about
the policy mechanisms.111,112 All recent increases in
protected areas have been on private [e.g., through
environmental non-governmental organizations
(NGOs)] or Aboriginal land, or via partnerships
between them.113 Some of these are very substantial,
with Indigenous Protected Areas contributing nearly
a third of the National Reserve System, and likely to
contribute to connectivity objectives.114 However, the
expectation that species will simply shift poleward
or upward is too simplistic; more multidirectional
movements have been demonstrated historically for
464 Australian bird species.115
Agriculture
Agriculture in Australia has long had to cope with
climatic variability at a range of timescales, and this
increases farmer confidence that they are reasonably
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well equipped for gradual change.80 The projected
climate change impacts on agriculture vary across
the continent (Tables 4 and 5).116–118 Changes in
extremes (e.g., higher peak temperatures and fewer
frosts) will have more impact than changes in average
temperature,119 and rainfall changes will affect crops
more than livestock. Water is the biggest issue; in the
southeast and southwest of Australia today, water
resources are fully or overallocated, even in years of
average rainfall,120 but the north of the continent
will get wetter. Earlier wine-grape ripening has been
identified due both to warming and declines in soil
moisture.121
Irrigated agriculture in the Murray-Darling
Basin is most at risk, particularly in the absence
of mitigation. High levels of water extraction for
irrigation are calculated to be a greater threat
to ecosystem health in the Murray-Darling Basin
than climate change, emphasizing the importance of
systems of water governance.118,122,123 Centralization
of basin management through the 2007 Water Act,
combined with voluntary sales of water rights by
irrigators during the Big Dry (Box 1), has delivered
some environmental benefits. These are difficult
to measure on conventional economic analyses,
compared with agriculture, for example, but CSIRO
estimate that they are considerable, including the gains
made in carbon sequestration by maintaining large
areas of river red gum and black box floodplain
vegetation.124 Such gains are arguably easier to
achieve during a crisis, and some argue that political
momentum has been lost since the end of the
drought.122
To take the example of wheat, productivity
projections at 2030 are regionally variable, and
include predictions of both decreased and increased
productivity under different rainfall scenarios,125
with considerable uncertainty about how enhanced
CO2 will interact with rainfall and temperature.126
Rainfall decreases are projected to be greatest in the
growth seasons of winter and spring.116 The Western
Australian wheat belt is likely to be affected more by
climate change than central western NSW.
While some aspects of agricultural planning can
operate over very long timescales, planting decisions
must still be made at the beginning of every season. It
is in the nature of agriculture that such decisions carry
inherent risks, but some of these could be mitigated
if improved forecasts of year to year rainfall and
variability were available.
Households
Households are recognized in all affluent societies
as an important site of climate change governance
for both mitigation and adaptation. In Australia,
calculations about household contributions to
national greenhouse gas emissions vary depending
on the assumptions made about where responsibility
is to be attributed: 13% if only direct energy use
within the household is considered, and 56% if the
emissions embedded in externally produced goods
and services consumed in the household context
are included.127 The difference in these figures
illustrates not only the difficulty of measurement,
but more importantly the conceptual challenge in
isolating ‘households’ as separable units. This is
a creative challenge because it helps us consider
the different flows and connections within society.
Households have been the focus of government
policy at all three levels of government, including
via support for solar panels, home insulation, water
tanks, light globes, shower timers, and education
campaigns for sustainability. An emerging body
of work helps understand relationships between
everyday household practices, cultural processes, and
climate change,128,129 for example, the influence of
ethnic diversity.74,130 Strong environmental beliefs do
not necessarily correlate with action; poor households
are most likely to be uninterested in climate change
TABLE 5 Projected Climate Change Impacts on Australian Agriculture for Given Changes in Temperature Relative to 1990.116
Change in Temperature Sector/Industry Impact
<1◦C Annual milk production per cow Fall by 250–310 L or 6%
Total factor productivity of wheat in NSW with lower rainfall −4.2%, relative to reference case
Total factor productivity of wheat in WA with lower rainfall −7.3%, relative to reference case
Total factor productivity of sheep meat in NSW with lower rainfall −1.8%, relative to reference case
Total factor productivity of sheep meat in WA with lower rainfall −6.1%, relative to reference case
1–2◦C Pasture productivity with 20% lower rainfall −15%
Liveweight gain in cattle with 20% lower rainfall −12%
3–4◦C Tick-related losses in net cattle production weight Increase by 128%
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TABLE 6 Examples of Features that Differentiate the Incremental and Transformative Decision-Making Processes Undertaken by Wine Industry
Stakeholders
Incremental
adaptation
Focus on change management for the short-term. ‘We’re worried about what we do next week rather than what
we’re doing in seven or 10 years time’.
Reactive management of change, focusing on current conditions. ‘I think we’re more reactive [than] proactive. I
don’t think that there’s any kind of looking at the tea leaves and saying this is going to happen to the climate
so therefore we should do this’.
Change management is focused on finding ways to keep the present system in operation. ‘My view is that if you
haven’t got enough water, then you move the water to the location; you don’t move the location to the water’.
Transformative
adaptation
Proactive management of present and future change, with a view to influencing it. ‘We actually try and create
the market for it and then plant the vines’.
Uncertainty in the future is acknowledged and built into decision-making. ‘We don’t factor on - now two
degrees, the number might be wrong but it’s still the thinking. We’re going to accept that there’s going to be
at least two degree temperature rise’.
Managing change includes questioning the effectiveness of existing systems and processes. ‘We just can’t keep
our decision making process the same’.
These examples relate to the initial stage of the adaptation action cycle; problem structuring and establishing the adaptation arena.138
but also least likely to have high consumption.131
Norms of cleanliness influence water consumption,132
domestic tanks do not save as much water as predicted
but water restrictions are accepted and effective if
enforced equitably.133 Smart meters do not challenge
practices considered nonnegotiable, such as appliance
use.134 Cohabiting extended families share some
things but not others.135 There is considerable cultural
resistance to eating low-emissions kangaroo meat.129
The point of focusing research activity at the
household scale is not because this will be the social
unit to bear all the responsibility of government policy
on climate change—although some public discussion
of carbon pricing in Australia seems to promulgate
such a view. Rather, household research illustrates
how greenhouse gas emissions, mitigation actions,
and adaptive strategies can all emerge—sometimes
simultaneously—out of the same site or community.
Households, and research into their everyday
workings, provide an imaginative resource to envisage
alternative possibilities of shared responsibility, risk-
bearing, and social transformation. As further
illustration, the more detailed indigenous example
below shows also that adaptation capacities and
vulnerabilities are uneven, but that creative solutions
can emerge from contexts of strong social need.
Transformational Adaptation
The biodiversity, agriculture, and emergency manage-
ment examples show the combination of incremental
and transformative changes happening and poten-
tially necessary. There is an emerging literature on
transformational adaptation, not only to a possible
4◦ warmer world, but also to the increased level
of surprise and uncertainty associated with rapid
change in complex systems. Australian researchers
are contributing productively to this research
conversation,136,137 for example, in comparing
incremental and transformative decision-making
processes in the wine industry138 (Table 6).
The tension between such research and the
more gradualist assumptions implicit in most policy
approaches is illustrated in some of the discussion
associated with the Productivity Commission’s recent
Report on Barriers to Climate Change Adaptation.139
Our focus on this example is not to engage with any
specific recommendations, nor to fully engage with
the complex question of where, how and to what
extent governments should be involved in adaptation,
both of which would be beyond the scope of this
overview, but rather to show that there is a live
and emerging debate over how adaptation is mostly
conceptualized and framed. Commenting on the draft
report,140 the CSIRO supported most of the specific
recommendations, but noted:
However, the Draft Report has a framing which
CSIRO believes underestimates the challenges of
adaptation policy and action by governments,
industries and communities.
CSIRO considers that this framing overstates the
degree of uncertainty about future climate change
and the inability of people to make decisions in
the face of this uncertainty. We also consider that
the Draft Report overstates the inherent capacity of
individuals, communities and industries to act, and
act in a proactive way.
As a consequence of this framing CSIRO is of
the view that the Draft Report underestimates the
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TABLE 7 Examples of Transformational Adaptation for 4◦ of warming.142
Governance Significant changes to social policy to manage changing expectations of living standards and way of life.
Alternative governance arrangements in place as local governments become increasingly unable to cope, particularly in
coastal areas.
Coastal
settlements
Policy and planning mechanisms in place necessary to redesign and/or relocate urban settlements as required in
response to climate change threats, while maintaining/enhancing liveability.
Put policies in place to manage a tendency by the private sector to withdraw from insuring risk, so that it is appropriately
shared with the public sector. This could translate to more assertive policies to reduce risk and clarify responsibility.
Infrastructure Significant reform of consumer expectations of the reliability of service delivery.
Repositioning of facilities for dealing with waste water (sewage) to avoid pump outages due to flooding and
consequent contamination of other water bodies & supplies.
Financial
institutions Some level of private insurance is compulsory. Premiums are directly linked to the assessed risk of individual assets.
Some residual risk resides with asset owners. Significant reform of consumer expectations regarding insurance
coverage.
Investment decision frameworks are integrated with public sector contingency funding to coordinate appropriate
investment responses to extreme events.
Water Rural—Transformation and relocation of agricultural production – different outputs using different farming systems,
input mixes, and in different locations.
Urban—Complete cultural change to urban water use reflecting increased scarcity and unreliability of supply.
Demand managed effective through pricing and allocation, support by water-efficient urban design.
risks to Australia, resulting in a generally superficial
analysis of the role of government in adaptation
across the economy. This includes not undertaking
a quantitative assessment of the economic costs and
benefits of different interventions to support the
recommendations.141
The final report did contain a number of
changes from the draft report, including removal of
the controversial statement that ‘Most adaptation
would occur without the need for government inter-
vention’ (draft report p. 7). It also quoted the CSIRO
advocacy of the need to consider non-stationarity,
nonlinear change, and emergent properties (final
report p. 96), but did not build such thinking into any
recommendations. The examples of transformational
adaptation provided in the CSIRO submission
(Table 7) are quite different in tone and scope. For
example, whereas the Productivity Commission report
looked at the priority reforms needed at different lev-
els of government139, CSIRO highlighted the need for
‘Alternative governance arrangements in place as local
governments become increasingly unable to cope,
particularly in coastal areas.’ The CSIRO submission
and other discussions of transformative adaptation
allude to the necessity of alternative governance mech-
anisms, and the necessity for these to interact with
existing levels of government. In the wider Australian
polity this conversation is yet to really begin.
AUSTRALIAN INDIGENOUS
COMMUNITIES AND CLIMATE
CHANGE
The Australian indigenous population is around
575,000 people (2.5% of the Australian population).
Indigenous people from mainland Australia are
usually termed Aboriginal, with Torres Strait Islanders
forming a culturally distinct indigenous group from
the islands between Australia and Papua New Guinea;
within both these broad groupings there is significant
diversity. While there is an increasing concentration
in urban areas, one quarter of indigenous people live
in remote or very remote areas. Some of this relatively
small latter group owns and manages around 23%
of the continent, albeit very unevenly distributed
geographically and demographically. Much of it is in
arid, semiarid and, tropical zones, including significant
areas of coastline (Figure 5).
Numerous reports143 have identified the para-
dox that while they may contribute the least to climate
change, indigenous communities globally are amongst
the most vulnerable to its impacts. Low socioeconomic
status, dependence on natural resources, residence in
particularly vulnerable geographic regions, and his-
tories of inadequate policy response in settler states,
all create increased vulnerabilities. Conversely, some
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FIGURE 5 | Map of the Indigenous estate in Australia at 2010, also showing discrete indigenous communities.5
cultural characteristics may mean that some indige-
nous communities are well placed to develop effective
adaptive responses to climate threats, and indigenous
knowledge systems may contribute significantly to
understanding climate change.
Significant focus in research has been on health
outcomes. In Australia, a 200-year history144 of
institutionalized racism and inadequate policy has
meant that Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander
people have the lowest status of all subgroups
for most indicators (for example health, education,
income, and housing).145 They may be particularly
vulnerable to health impacts from climate change,146
e.g., an increase in mosquito-borne diseases in
remote northern locations, increased nutrition-related
illness due to decreased opportunities to access
wild resources, and increased mental health impacts
because ‘connection to country’ is often seen as a
strong element of Aboriginal culture.147,148
There is potential for strong contributions from
indigenous knowledge systems to understanding
and responding to climate change.149 Intimate and
detailed knowledge of biophysical environments over
long time frames means changes are often observed
and noted. Indigenous knowledge systems are
typically adaptive,150 so responses such as adjusting
times for carrying out traditional burning (in response
to changed humidity and rainfall for example) are
already occurring. Most national park agencies have
developed climate change strategies that include
indigenous cultural heritage management.151,152 The
nature of indigenous land holdings also offers unique
opportunities for creative responses to climate change
issues (see Box 2). The development of the Indigenous
Protected Area (IPA) system since 1995 has had
significant benefits for both indigenous communities
and biodiversity and heritage conservation.153,154
IPAs are unique in retaining indigenous authority and
control, allowing specifically indigenous responses
to both biophysical and cultural dimensions. Recent
innovations in IPAs are embracing multi-tenure and
marine contexts,155 both significant in climate change
responses. Indigenous people have been excluded
from river management processes across the country,
resulting in calls for recognition of the unique Indige-
nous relationships to water (cultural flows) now being
promoted in diverse landscapes across Australia. Cul-
tural flows attempt to maintain the spiritual, cultural,
environmental, social, and healthy livelihoods of
indigenous peoples, recognizing the significant over-
allocations of water for commercial purposes.156,157
Analysis of the relationships between indigenous
cultural characteristics and climate change impacts
suggests both strengths and weaknesses.161 The
maintenance of extended kinship networks can
exacerbate residential overcrowding in situations
of inadequate housing, widespread in both urban
and rural and remote locations. Overcrowding
can then lead to increased health vulnerabilities.
Conversely, the same extended kinship networks
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BOX 2
CARBON MANAGEMENT ON
INDIGENOUS COUNTRY
Australia’s carbon tax is heavily reliant on
carbon offsetting by industry. Although the
effectiveness of offsetting is controversial, sev-
eral such schemes on indigenous country provide
social, economic, and cultural benefits as well
as mitigation ones.158 The West Arnhem Land
Fire Abatement program (WALFA)159 uses offset
payments from a gas producer to support a cul-
tural savannah burning strategy that continues
knowledge and culture while simultaneously
maintaining high biodiversity and reducing car-
bon production from wildfire. In 2000, savanna
fires caused 40% of official greenhouse gas
emissions in the Northern Territory, accounting
for 2–4% of Australia’s total greenhouse gas
emissions. In its first 5 years, the WALFA scheme
reduced emissions by the equivalent of more
than 707,000 tonnes of CO2. New national
policy initiatives such as the Carbon Farming
program are attempting to engage further with
indigenous landholders to develop combined
environmental and economic outcomes, includ-
ing a targeted Indigenous Carbon Farming
Fund.160 WALFA is inspiring other schemes, such
as those developed over the last 2 years by Aak
Puul Ngantam [’Our father’s father’s country’]
Ltd in Cape York. APN contributes to local
livelihoods, employing more than thirty local
people, and facilitating education of children
on their traditional country.158
may generate significant social capital and broader
exchange networks that may offset decreased access
to appropriate food and other resources. The highly
mobile nature of many indigenous families can
increase possibilities for relocation due to, for
example, extreme coastal weather events. Many
indigenous communities exist at the peripheries of
government and civil support, both geographically
and in policy terms. While this obviously increases
vulnerabilities, it also means that communities are
often used to being self-sufficient and may respond
more effectively to breakdowns in civil services. For
Australian indigenous people, emergency management
can be particularly fraught. A history of state-
sanctioned forced removals and dispossession means
there is significant distrust, and a strong potential for
evacuations to become relocations, separating people
from their homelands.162
Existing research has focused on remote and
rural communities, with many place-based studies in
national parks, areas of Aboriginal,163 and Torres
Strait Islander164,165 homelands, and a particular
focus on northern Australia. There is a distinct lack
of research on urban communities, a significant gap
as nearly a third of the indigenous population is now
primarily resident in urban areas.166
CONCLUSION
We have outlined the impacts of current and projected
climate change on a predominantly arid continent that
has long experienced spatially and temporally variable
climatic conditions, supporting a human population
clustered in coastal cities via a fossil-fuel based
economy. With over a quarter-century of intermittent
steps toward mitigation, the nation has recently
instituted a price on carbon to shift the economy
toward renewable energy provision over the next few
decades. Although there has been some history of
bipartisan action toward climate change mitigation,
that is not the case at present, and with a Federal
election due in September 2013, the carbon pricing
legislation may not survive a change of government.
Just as the Anthropocene itself is relatively
rapid in geological terms, a quarter-century to slow
down and start to turn around a high emissions
economy is also relatively rapid, given the exponential
trajectory of post-World War II growth. But that
now looks to be about two decades too long.
For political, intellectual, and cultural reasons both
mitigation and adaptation actions have been framed
in gradualist terms to garner the necessary public
support, against vociferous opposition from a range
of vested economic interests.167 Those gradualist
responses, while significant achievements, now look
to be insufficiently transformative to deal effectively
with extreme or step-changes in which significant
thresholds will be crossed.
On the basis of this review, the maintenance of
existing research efforts and investment is critical. (Yet
at the time of writing the National Climate Change
Adaptation Research Facility is about to run out of
funding.168) We also identify four additional areas of
significant research and policy priority.
1. Both mitigation targets and adaptation scenarios
in Australia are framed in terms of gradualist
change increasingly at odds with scientific
discussion of the need to keep fossil fuels
in the ground, and the possibility of a four
degree warmer world. We argue that it is
therefore time for the research community to
190 © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Volume 5, March/Apr i l 2014
WIREs Climate Change Climate change and Australia
pay systematic attention to mechanisms and
processes of transformative change, by which
we mean profound, unwanted and probably
forced change at a scale of years as well as
decades and centuries. Where are the pressure
points most likely to be felt, and thresholds
crossed, in economic processes, in biodiversity,
in agricultural production and food security, in
the insurance industry, in domestic experience,
in social cohesion? We do not suggest that
research try to be precisely predictive, rather
that at least some of us need to be thinking
systematically about worst-case scenarios.
2. A major challenge to assist forecasting is to
understand the climate drivers that generate
Australia’s high year-to-year rainfall variability.
Significant progress has been made in this
endeavor with a greater understanding of drivers
such as ENSO and the indian ocean dipole (IOD)
leading to improved predictions; however, given
that the drivers themselves may be changing
in response to higher greenhouse gases the
scientific community must be supported to
address this challenge and continue to provide
meaningful climate forecasts for Australian
industries, agriculturalists, water managers, and
communities.
3. Australia is well known for its strong civic
(both professional and volunteer) capacities
in the management of emergencies such as
fire, flood, and drought. If the changes ahead
of us become more extreme, it is important
to also ask which cross-cultural capacities
and traditions within Australia’s multicultural
communities provide the most useful resources
for effecting and coping with transformative
change? The stoic bush family facing drought,
and the heroic volunteer fire-fighter are powerful
cultural myths; they need to be joined by more
diverse experiences that recognize everyday
capacities as well as vulnerabilities. Research
has begun to engage with these questions, but
there is much more to be done.
4. What combinations of strong government (fed-
eral, state, and local) and more dynamic commu-
nity responsibility are likely to be necessary and
viable? We have discussed some experiments
in indigenous land management over the last
two decades or so (IPAs, joint management of
National Parks, partnerships with environmen-
tal NGOs) that may provide wider inspiration
for more creative mechanisms. These provide
one example; urban households provide another
very different scale of governance. Each has its
own complexities. Alternative and additional
governance mechanisms in the future will need
to be envisaged in forms that invest in both
social and ecological capital.
Postscript
The Federal election on September 7 resulted in a
decisive win to the Liberal-National Party Coalition.
Prime Minister-elect Abbott immediately began a
process to get rid of the carbon pricing legislation.
As the Coalition faces a hostile Senate until at least
mid-2014, when new senators will take their seats,
the process for undoing the legislation may not be
straightforward. The Labor party and the Greens,
who together could command a Senate majority until
mid-2014, have declared their intention to oppose any
attempt to repeal the legislation169 .
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